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Due to the situation that has emerged in the wake of retail lending, particularly 
foreign currency lending, every circumstance that leads to excessive systemic risks 
must be taken into consideration, namely the absence of consumer self-control, 
under- and overreactions and the risks stemming from intertemporal retail consumer 
decisions. The authors attempt to make consumer decisions understandable by 
analysing biased intertemporal models. Based on the relevant literature, the authors 
use a behavioural science approach to shed light using on the underlying factors of 
action or passivity, the factors that introduce bias into consumer rationality and their 
potential management, in particular asset regulation and the fair bank acts, deeper 
and more comprehensive regulation of legal relationships, keeping in mind not only 
the key interest of consumer protection, but also the predictable and sustainable 
long-term functioning of financial institutions.
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1. Introduction
Consumers’ consumption-related decisions are often made not on a rational basis 
but in a manner describable using intertemporal choice models, accompanied by 
under- and overreactions. The organisations offering products and services are 
often familiar with and even exploit these decision asymmetries. They develop 
products and offer services for consumers using this acquired knowledge. The 
protagonists of the system of financial intermediation play a particularly important 
role. These protagonists play a key role in making available the funding needed 
for consumption, thereby determining future consumption. This lends particular 
relevance to the investigation of this topic.
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Corporations, but particularly and specifically financial institutions, enhance and 
catalyse the decision-making process based on their knowledge of the key drivers 
and motives of consumer behaviour in an effort to maximise profits in a shorter 
amount of time. This behaviour necessarily fosters a biased, non-rational decision-
making process that focuses on short-term benefits and ignores the medium- and 
long-term drawbacks and negative consequences. (Paradoxically, the characteristics 
of such behaviour exhibited by the management and shareholders of financial 
institutions are identical to those of irrational consumer conduct.) This process is 
further reinforced by information asymmetry and consumer impatience. Thus from 
the perspective of our topic, it is necessary to first analyse biased intertemporal 
models which give us an understanding of consumer decisions. Understanding 
the identified causes and motives can bring us closer to resolving the issue. Using 
a behavioural science approach, we can gain an understanding of the underlying 
factors of action or passivity.
2. A history of intertemporal decisions and the discounted utility 
model 
Intertemporal decisions were first modelled by Fischer (1930) in 1930, who found 
that a comparison of the current perceived utility at various points in time depends 
on the marginal rate of substitution for the various points in time. The marginal rate 
of substitution is determined by the time preference and declining marginal utility. 
The discounted utility model created by Paul Anthony Samuelson was a major step 
forward in this area; it spread quickly and became highly popular mainly thanks to 
its simplicity, which resides in its capacity to condense numerous heterogeneous 
and diverse (psychological) factors into a single parameter, the discount rate, and 
regarding this discount rate as constant. On this basis, the utilities emerging at 
different points in time became easily comparable. Samuelson (1937:156) wrote 
that “during any specified period of time, the individual behaves so as to maximize 
the sum of all future utilities, they being reduced to comparable magnitudes by 
suitable time discounting. The individual discounts future utilities and some simple 
regular fashion which is known to us.” Therefore, the model must be associated with 
positive time discount rates, i.e. a more distant point in the future will always have 
a lower perceived utility and will therefore reinforce consumption that is closer to 
the present. The discounted utility model treats the discount factor exponentially, in 
other words the ratio of perceived utility linked to current and future consumption 
will change constantly per unit (of time). The discounted utility model is therefore 
characterised by a constant discount rate and a time-consistent preference (Bölcskei 
2009).
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2.1. Hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic models describing present-biased 
preferences
It is no coincidence that the set of criteria presented above was increasingly 
questioned and contested. The constant discount rate and the consistent preference 
over time appeared unrealistically regular, even norm-like, with respect to which 
empirical studies yielded results that called the model into question. However, 
numerous experiments conducted in the context of behavioural economics refuted 
the discounted utility model. As a result of these, it also became clear that the 
behaviour of participants can be better described using a different discounting 
model. Hyperbolic and quasi hyperbolic models that describe present-biased 
preferences emerged from further research. 
The model was amended several times before in 1992 Loewenstein and Prelec 
finally created generalised hyperbolic discounting, which was capable of addressing 
numerous earlier anomalies and offering a more general description of human 
behaviour. However, it was more difficult to apply in more complex models 
(Neszveda – Dezső 2012).
The main tenet of quasi hyperbolic discounting is associated with Phelps and Pollak 
(1968) In essence, the discount rate that can be assigned to periods is inconsistent 
when choosing between periods and associates a higher discount rate to short-
term time preferences. In comparison, quasi hyperbolic discounting also describes 
behaviour that is inconsistent over time similarly to hyperbolic discounting, but 
the model is simpler and easier to manage compared to hyperbolic discounting 
models (Nagy 2011).
2.2. Significance and applicability of hyperbolic and quasi hyperbolic models
“The significance of hyperbolic and quasi hyperbolic models lies primarily in the fact 
that they allow us to describe and explain human behaviours that were formerly 
indescribable” (Bölcskei 2009:1027). As a result of present-biased preferences, 
perceived utility associated with current consumption is assigned a greater weight 
than perceived utility associated with future consumption. Exponential discounting 
applied in a neoclassical context results in greater utility of current consumption 
compared to the utility of consumption at any later point in time. However, delaying 
future consumption as much as possible decreases the associated utility not just 
exponentially, but to an even greater degree. With regard to this, the individual 
becomes interested in consuming comprehensively, even in excess of his current 
financial means, or more precisely, to maximise the associated perceived utility. 
However, the latter depends on numerous other factors, and thus developments 
in the marginal utility of consumption, the size of discount rates, the expected 
developments in future income and interest on credit jointly determine whether 
the individual borrows or not.
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The hyperbolic discounted model has become a popular area of application for 
studies of self-control issues. Why are hyperbolic models well-suited for describing 
issues of self-control? Self-control is fundamentally assumed of consumers by 
traditional neoclassical economics based on rationality. Rational consumers are, for 
instance, capable of ranking things based on utility according to the Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1953) rationality system. The consumer therefore has adequate self-
control, in other words, he will not make irrational decisions precisely because he 
can control himself. The problem with this is that in reality, consumers often make 
irrational decisions that traditional economics are unable to adequately explain.
The matter of self-control issues provides a tool for giving an approximation 
of reality. In the case of an individual with self-control issues, divergence from 
rationality can be explained with this factor. Several authors modelled this, for 
instance Camerer et al. (1997), who concluded in their paper on New York taxi 
drivers that drivers often defined their operation and the duration of their work 
time based on heuristic decisions. The authors argue that adaptive models rooted 
in psychology have better forecasting capacities in cases where the area under 
review is shaped by human decisions. Accordingly, hyperbolic models are able to 
adequately handle the situation: if we are unable to keep the desires embodying 
preferences under control, preferences automatically shift in time towards the 
present, we want to fulfil them as soon as possible and live out our desires. The 
mathematical formalisation of behavioural finance, which we will not address here 
for the sake of brevity, is further hindered by the fact that decisions are not single-
periodic, but rather multi-periodic and are strongly shaped by risk and uncertainty 
(Merton 1969).
Broadly speaking, present welfare utility based on hyperbolic models is always 
far higher than future utility and therefore sudden profit in the present is much 
more attractive and likewise, immediate expense is always more painful than future 
expense.
3. Application of behavioural economic findings and intertemporal 
models in the financial sector
Consumer loans in a “legally regulated” framework – including a legal framework 
for enforceability – originated in the early 20th century. As their national economic 
significance increased in the wake of their effect on consumption, their widespread 
dissemination became inevitable. This process entailed the emergence and 
excessive growth of inadequate lending practices that triggered adverse social 
consequences that far exceeded the earlier periods.
It should be taken into account that the present-future exchange also works 
“backwards”, in other words an individual can take out a loan to be able to consume 
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in excess of his current financial means by giving up future consumption as a result 
of an inconsistent present-biased time preference. Consumers’ time inconsistent 
behaviour presented above is not a novelty in the realm of bank lending.
Credit cards, which are becoming increasingly popular and are being used by more 
and more consumers in Hungary, are a typical form of consumer credit and their 
emergence has been the subject of widespread research. The following section 
presents the main findings of this research.
Laibson – Repetto – Tobacman (2003) reported that the ratio of credit card debt 
in the United States is salient, suggesting that consumers borrow a lot at a high 
cost. This process already includes irrational elements in and of itself, as the cost 
of credit card debt is far higher than money market interest rates. The paper 
also highlighted that the ratio of long-term de facto illiquid savings is also high, 
which assumes a hyperbolic discounting preference and fundamentally calls into 
question the possibility of exponential discounting. Consumer naïveté is identified 
as a possible explanation in the paper. The case presented in the Ausubel (1999) 
paper, considered a novelty at the time, is now considered a classical example of 
consumer overreaction. According to the study, credit card applicants are unable 
to estimate the future balance of their credit card with any measure of accuracy 
and expect to borrow lower or far lower amounts. This is due to the fact that they 
are unable to accurately recognise credit offered at very low interest during the 
introductory period and by the time this preferential period expires, the consumer is 
faced with an excessive repayment at far higher interest. In this scenario, consumers 
underestimate the loan amount actually taken out in the future and simultaneously 
overreact to the preferential low interest rate intended as an introductory tool. 
Besides under and overreaction, Ausubel (1999) also emphasised the phenomenon 
of adverse selection whereby if the consumer took advantage of the credit 
conditions offered with the introductory period instalment, you will have greater 
propensity to take out a larger credit amount. This finding simultaneously signals 
the risk of such behaviour to the creditor, as these customers are far riskier. By and 
large, the findings of the study may indirectly point to the emergence of moral 
hazard. The lending financial corporation is aware that with preferential offers, 
they can attract a customer base comprising increasingly more and increasingly 
riskier consumers. This process may therefore result in the creation of a stock of 
bad quality debt.
In their study of classic purchase loans, Stango and Zinman (2009) identified as 
a fundamental issue the fact that consumers are unable to adequately evaluate 
the actual cost of offers due to their illiteracy. As they are unable to do this, lacking 
the intellectual faculties and financial literacy, they are more likely to accept offers 
that are more disadvantageous for them. The paper also revealed that adequate 
information of consumers did not change the situation, nor did market competition 
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resolve the issue. Although a stock comprising consumers who seek out a more 
expensive service is more profitable in the short run, it leads to the emergence of 
credit risk in the medium and long run.
Koltay and Vincze (2009) summed up the essence of this as follows: “The most 
common causes identified are usually non-exponential discounting, naïveté 
and excessive self-confidence, alongside cognitive flaws such as the incapacity 
to perform mathematical and financial calculations and errors in objectively 
defining the decision-making situation. Evidence of hyperbolic (non-exponential) 
discounting, naïveté and excessive self-confidence tend to be indirect, and these 
hypotheses taken together seem better suited for characterising behaviour than 
exponential discounting and the assumption of total rationality.” (Koltay – Vincze 
2009:513). Banks offer numerous products to their retail clientele that specifically 
take advantage of this present-biased time preference. The Sebestyén et al (2011) 
paper contests that dynamically time inconsistent preferences played a critical 
role in the emergence of the issue, but the authors concede that waived upfront 
fees and preferential initial period interests are common methods in Hungarian 
lending today. Today, consumer loans that do not have to be repaid during an initial 
grace period have also become widely familiar to and accepted by consumers. 
Such offers are particularly attractive during busy periods of buying, for example 
before holidays. Bank offers that propose the soonest possible utilisation of the 
loan amount instead or alongside preferential repayment or a grace period are 
also based on the characteristics of a present-biased time inconsistent positive 
time preference. Pre-paid deposit interest schemes, where the credit institution 
credited the interest on the deposit made by the customer at the time the deposit 
was made also took advantage of intertemporal decision-making bias, allowing 
the customer to get the interest at the beginning of deposit maturity, to use or 
consume it immediately, with the bank essentially having lent the deposit interest 
to the consumer.
Bank lending can easily lead (and has led) to consumer borrowing where the 
debtor’s inconsistent time preference, optimistic and excessively self-confident 
estimation of his future financial situation spur him to borrow credit that he is 
later unable to repay. The information advantage of financial intermediaries also 
contributed to the emergence of this lending practice. It is actually more accurate 
and professional to refer to information asymmetry rather than an information 
advantage, as bank products and services almost always require special know-how 
that most customers fully lack or only partially possess. The latter scenario may 
unfortunately result in even more severe consequences in the absence of the right 
professional background knowledge and general professional know-how than a total 
lack of professional know-how.
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In order to gain more comprehensive insight on the topic, the matter of consumer 
impatience should also be addressed. Consumer impatience emerges when 
consumers are compelled to forgo consumer goods and delay their purchases for 
a given period of time. “Once the reason for temporarily forgoing consumer goods 
is resolved, deferred consumption is compensated for, due to consumer impatience. 
In such scenarios, the marginal propensity to consume is much higher” (Tóth – Árvai 
2001:1024).
Although these behavioural patterns are detrimental in and of themselves, they 
may cause substantial macroeconomic harm if they affect a large portion of society. 
“There is such a severe lack of financial literacy within society that it impedes 
recovery and consolidation during cyclical economic crises” (Kovács 2015:87).
In line with the one-off examples and the findings of the literature, the affected 
consumer decisions are shaped by behavioural economic drivers. In other words, 
the irrational causes of consumer decisions identified by behavioural economics 
are: present-biased positive (time) preference, excessive optimism, excessive self-
confidence, information asymmetry and information processing shortcomings. The 
increasingly severe problem that emerges from this calls for an examination of the 
optimal potential solutions. Among the potential solutions, regulation is the one 
we consider most effective.
4. Emergence and escalation of the issue
Understanding the issue and the regulatory solution to it calls for an overview of 
the main features of foreign currency lending that emerged in Hungary and of the 
situation that preceded the introduction of the 2015 regulation which ultimately 
led to the adoption of the regulation. 
“As a result of the excessive race for growth, the Hungarian banking system 
mobilised significant external funding, primarily through parent banks. The 
Hungarian banking system consequently became very reliant on short-term foreign 
currency liabilities even by international standards, the loan-to-deposit ratio spiked 
even by regional standards and departed from the 100% figure considered sound. 
This is how cheap external funding increased risk-taking and fuelled procyclical 
lending.” (Bethlendi 2015:21)
In the context of foreign currency lending, a financial institution disburses the loan 
in the currency of its own country1 and the debtor repays both the principal and 
interest to the bank in this same currency, but the loan amount is kept on record in 
a foreign currency, or is disbursed in a foreign currency (the disbursement currency 
1  I.e. where the branch office is located.
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is the foreign currency) but is repaid in forint (the repayment currency is forint). 
Conversion is performed at the interest rate valid at the time of disbursement and 
repayment, as defined in the contract.
There were several fundamental issues with foreign currency lending, as loans were 
disbursed and repaid in forint but the loan was kept on record in a foreign currency, 
so the consumer in fact assumed the entire exchange rate risk. “Consumers who 
took out foreign currency loans assumed any potential exchange rate gain or loss. 
They obtained a right and an obligation on the foreign currency market, even if 
this was not their intention. Every forint by which the Swiss franc appreciated was 
their gain and every depreciation of the forint their loss. The latter could have 
been avoided with some sort of exchange rate insurance, but they did not buy 
foreign currency purchase rights or currency futures. If they had done the latter, 
they would precisely have lost the interest rate difference” (Száz 2015:82). In the 
majority of cases, this occurred for the long term; needless to say, it is impossible 
to model the exchange rate of currency pairs for this time horizon, in other words, 
foreign currency lending was in fact a product that could not be measured and as 
such, was extremely high risk.
The rational consumer expectation of Hungary joining the euro area and the 
adaptive exchange rate expectation that understandably developed in the 
population in the wake of the stable forint exchange rate when viewed from the 
time of contracting the loan, before the crisis, may have contributed to a portion of 
this borrowing (Kolozsi – Banai – Vonnák 2015). Oftentimes, customers who were 
not creditworthy for forint loans became creditworthy for lower-interest foreign 
currency loans, ignoring the exchange rate risk (Bánfi 2013). “A significant portion 
of Hungarian households contracting foreign currency loans was (would have been) 
uncreditworthy in the domestic currency, which is why they were not granted forint 
loans. Add to this the fact that there is of course no long-term banking solution that 
can make an uncreditworthy customer creditworthy, especially not by changing 
the currency of the loan” (Lentner 2015:311). Foreign currency lending spread 
because it could be accessed with lower repayment instalments compared to forint 
loans, but was also associated with an unmeasurable risk for the consumer as 
described above, which consumers most likely ignored, were unaware of and were 
incapable of understanding the root of the risk. This despite the fact that “contrary 
to households, the banking sector has a far bigger toolset for managing risks 
stemming from retail foreign currency loans” (Kolozsi – Banai – Vonnák 2015:61).
Unfortunately, no better example than foreign currency lending could be found 
to illustrate the behavioural economic issues, biased intertemporal decisions and 
undervaluation and overvaluation addressed in the previous section.
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5. The Fair Bank Act
Act LXXVIII of 2014 on the amendment of Act CLXII of 2009 on Loans to Consumers 
and certain related acts (hereinafter: Fair Bank Act) created what was known 
as the fair banking system, which introduced transparent and understandable 
developments in consumer loan contract interest rates. The relevant stipulations 
defined in the statutes came into effect on 1 February 2015. “Legislators have 
extended the tasks of central banks worldwide. Central bank decision-makers 
themselves have reassessed the economic role of their institutions. In light of these 
changes, the economic responsibility of central banks can be interpreted as an 
obligation for central banks to be more attuned to the social impacts of economic 
processes.” (Lentner – Szegedi – Tatay 2015:39)
According to the data of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, “the volume of consumer 
loans peaked on 30 June 2010, representing an aggregate value in excess of HUF 
8,647.9 billion. This figure then decreased continuously until 2014, but the volume 
of consumer loans still exceeded HUF 6,802 billion on 30 June 2014. Of this amount, 
forint consumer loans account for HUF 3,139.1 billion and foreign currency loans 
account for HUF 3,662.9 billion. Based on the foregoing, the legislator drafted 
a bill for the amendment of the Fair Bank Act in an effort to increase the level of 
consumer protection in the context of loan contract law.”2
5.1. The main amendments
Act LXXVIII of 2014 on the amendment of Act CLXII of 2009 on Loans to Consumers 
and certain related acts addresses the following main issues:
5.1.1. Enhancing the efficiency of the information obligation before contract 
conclusion
The rational consumer framework not only means correctly interpreting information, 
but also requires having sufficient information for drawing correct conclusions 
(Barberis – Thaler 2003).
It is therefore paramount that customers be given accurate and sufficient 
information prior to concluding a loan contract. It is even a necessary condition 
that the contract text be disclosed earlier. The Nobel prize-winning work of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1974) showed that in complex and risky decision 
situations, consumers often simplify the issue and make decisions based on earlier 
partial information, their subjective feelings, prejudices and rules of thumb instead 
of rational analysis. 
2  Statutory reasoning: Act LXXVIII of 2014 on the amendment of Act CLXII of 2009 on Loans to Consumers 
and certain related acts.
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Thus, in order to allow consumers to make more effective and rational decisions, 
the act states that the creditor and the lending intermediary are required to provide 
information to consumers prior to contract conclusion. The should enable the 
consumer to assess whether the prospective loan is a good fit for his needs and 
financial ability. For instance, the publication online of loan contract templates by 
creditors is aimed at helping prospective borrowers make an informed decision.
This provision was badly needed because although there had been prior regulation 
against misleading consumers, the new regulation not only restricted misinformation 
but also addressed the conscious exploitation of the decision-making flaws and non-
rational preferences of prospective borrowers.
5.1.2. Other regulations
The debt cap regulation came into effect on 1 January 2015 based on two main 
pillars. “The payment-to-income ratio (PTI) will limit the maximum initial debt-
servicing burden as a percentage of customers’ regular legal income, thereby 
moderating the accumulation of household debt. The loan-to-value ratio (LTV) will 
cap the maximum amount of secured household lending (e.g. mortgage loans) as 
a percentage of the value of collateral.”3
For instance, the payment-to-income ratio can be calculated as follows:
Payment-to-income ratio = monthly debt service/certified net monthly income
This may clearly foster a reduction of the shadow economy, as borrowing in the 
future will only be possible taking into account declared legal income. In addition, 
short-term profitability may override long-term profitability on the creditor side in 
lending practice. In this scenario, competition emerges for the largest market share, 
which can be achieved amongst others by reaching increasingly risky borrowers. 
Internal bank debt cap rules may be loosened during this effort, which may warrant 
an externally defined debt cap that halts risk-increasing competition. Therefore, 
systemic regulation aimed at restricting excessive borrower indebtedness is capable 
of mitigating the emergence of systemic risks.
5.1.3. Annual percentage rate cap
The “Loan contract terms and changes therein” subheading of Act LXXVIII of 2014 
on the amendment of Act CLXII of 2009 on consumer credit and certain related acts 
was supplemented with the following passage: “The creditor (…) cannot extend 
credit to consumers with an annual percentage rate that exceeds the central bank 
base rate increased by 24 percentage points. In the case of credit card contracts, 
payment account credits, or pledged collateral credits, the annual percentage rate 
3  The payment-to-income ratio limitation acts as a debt cap to protect consumers. Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
press release, 27 August 2014.
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may not exceed the central bank base rate increased by 39 percentage points.” 
Borrowers often fail to rationally assess their future repayment capacity. The annual 
percentage rate cap is necessary if a portion of consumers overestimate their future 
income and would accept irrational credit fees given their current situation due 
to the behavioural asymmetries presented in the previous chapters. Fischhoff – 
Slovic – Lichtenstein (1977) confirmed this excessive self-confidence, concluding 
that consumer expectations in which they feel fully confident only materialise with 
an 80 per cent likelihood in reality. From the perspective of our topic, the excessive 
optimism linked to future increases in income prevailing in behavioural finance 
may lead to excessive indebtedness if the consumer takes on debt that is too high 
in reality.
6. Conclusions
The legislative intervention that aims to disrupt the basic principle of contractual 
freedom in the realm of private law in exceptional cases may offer a solution to the 
asymmetries presented in the models describing present-biased preferences. In 
such scenarios, the consumer has a high likelihood of finding himself in a situation 
where the contractual balance shifts to his detriment due to the inconsistent 
time preference, excessive self-confidence and optimistic estimates of the future. 
Although the reasoning of the regulation and the guiding legal practice primarily 
cite information asymmetry, it can legitimately be assumed that the identified 
causes can in and of themselves lead to contractual inequality. Our view is that 
the information asymmetry between the contracting parties further undermines 
the consumer’s contractual position and the adequate information, professional 
know-how and experience cannot unequivocally neutralise a decision triggered 
by a biased time preference, as the latter is primarily psychologically-based and 
significantly decreases the likelihood of a more rational decision based on objective 
information.
For the sake of comprehensiveness, it should also be added that if banks offer 
products to retail customers that specifically take advantage of this present-
biased time preference, it may further deteriorate the contractual balance. In our 
view, the present-biased time preference can even be regarded in and of itself as 
a circumstance that warrants legislative intervention in contractual freedom. We 
believe that the legislator offered adequate responses to the issues identified in 
the realm of behavioural economics, particularly the avoidance and prevention of 
intertemporal biased decision situations, the eradication of self-control issues, the 
management of information asymmetry, overreactions and consumer impatience. 
The statutory limitation of the rights of financial institutions in the interest of 
consumers (information obligation, the guaranteeing of broader contractual rights), 
the protection of consumers from themselves (debt cap regulations), the reduction 
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of information asymmetry (enhanced information obligation, the introduction of 
interest and interest margin indicators, the preliminary definition of the interest 
methodology of loans) are all steps that are geared towards reducing or remedying 
flawed (irrational) consumer decisions made as a result of the anomalies identified 
by behavioural economics.
In order to effectively address the identified issues, however, in addition to 
successful regulation, smoothly functioning supervision is also necessary to enforce 
the statutory requirements adopted in the interest of consumers. Significant trend-
like changes have recently emerged in this domain. The fair bank legislative package, 
as it is commonly referred to, introduces a new regulatory framework that may be 
capable of managing the biased intertemporal decisions, consumer self-control 
issues and underreactions and overreactions that reflect consumer irrationality. The 
legislator recognised the social need that stems from the underlying inequalities 
and information asymmetry residing in consumer decisions. However, it is uncertain 
to what extent the legislator intends to intervene in the private law relationships 
of parties from a regulatory perspective. Too little intervention is incapable of 
curbing the potential adverse consequences of inequality between parties, while 
too much intervention could change the behaviour of economic agents to such an 
extent that it could distort market competition and excessively and unwarrantedly 
restrict economic development. But even well-crafted regulation and the effective 
enforcement of the law are unable to fully address the issue because as we have 
seen, the underlying factors of flawed irrational decisions are behavioural in nature, 
in other words consumer behaviour needs to be changed, or more specifically 
its motives and drivers. This underlying motivation and mentality can be shaped 
not with legal tools, but with education, training and information. Consequently, 
education and training tools must be adopted alongside the legal toolset, and only 
their concurrent application can yield a truly effective and comprehensive solution.
References
Ausubel, L.M. (1999): Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market. Working Paper, 
Department of Economics, University of Maryland.
Bánfi, Z. (2013): Lehet-e túlzott mértékű a lakossági eladósodottság? (Can retail indebtedness 
be excessive?) Pénzügyi Szemle Online. http://www.penzugyiszemle.hu/vitaforum/lehet-
e-tulzott-merteku-a-lakossagi-eladosodottsag. Downloaded: 9 June 2016.
Barberis, N – Thaler, R (2003): A survey of behavioral finance. Handbook of the Economics 
of Finance. Elsevier, pp. 1053–1128. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0102(03)01027-6. 
Bethlendi, A. (2015): Egy rossz termékfejlesztésből rendszerszintű piaci kudarc. A hazai 
lakossági deviza-jelzáloghitelezés. (A systemic market failure that arose from flawed 
168 Essay
Barna Fömötör – Anett Parádi-Dolgos – Zoltán Sipiczki
product development. Foreign currency mortgage lending to the Hungarian population.) 
Hitelintézeti Szemle, 14(1), March: 5–29. 
Bölcskei, V. (2009): Az intertemporális döntések viselkedés közgazdaságtani modelljeinek 
áttekintése. (An overview of the behavioural economic models of intertemporal decisions.) 
Közgazdasági Szemle, LVI, November: 1025–1040. 
Camerer, C. – Babcock, L. – Loewenstein, G. – Thaler, R. (1997): Labor Supply of New York City 
Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112. May: 407–441. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555244.
Fischhoff, B. – Slovic, P. – Lichtenstein, S. (1977): Knowing with certainty: The appropriateness 
of extreme confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 3: 552–564. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.3.4.552. 
Fisher, I. (1930): The Theory of Interest. Macmillan, New York.
Kolozsi, P.P. – Banai, Á. – Vonnák, B. (2015): A lakossági deviza-jelzáloghitelek kivezetése: 
időzítés és keretrendszer. (The tapering of retail foreign currency mortgage loans: timing 
and framework.) Hitelintézeti Szemle, 4(3), September: 60–87.
Koltay, G. – Vincze, J. (2009): Fogyasztói döntések a viselkedési közgazdaságtan szemszögéből. 
(Consumer decisions from the perspective of behavioural economics.) Közgazdasági Szemle, 
LVI, June: 495–252.
Kovács, L. (2015): A pénzügyi kultúra kutatása és aktuális feladataink. (Research on financial 
culture and our current tasks.) Gazdaság és Pénzügy, 2(1): 79–88.
Laibson, D. – Repetto, A. – Tobacman, J. (2003.): A Debt Puzzle. In: Aghion, P. – Frydman, R. 
– Stiglitz, J. – Woodford, M. (edit.): Knowledge, Information, and Expectations in Modern 
Economics. In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps. Princeton University Press, Princeton: 228–266. 
Lentner, Cs. – Szegedi, K. – Tatay, T. (2015): A központi bankok társadalmi felelőssége. (The 
social responsibility of central banks.) Vezetéstudomány, Budapest, 46(9–10): 35–47.
Lentner, Cs. (2015): A lakossági devizahitelezés kialakulásának és konszolidációjának 
rendszertani vázlata. (A systemic outline of the emergence and consolidation of retail 
foreign currency lending.) Pénzügyi Szemle, 60(3): 305–318.
Loewenstein, G. – Prelec, D. (1992): Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an 
Interpretation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, 107(2): 573–
597. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118482.
Merton, R. (1969): Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous –Time Case. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, August: 247–257. https://doi.org/10.2307/1926560.
169
Behavioural Finance and Consumer Loan Contracts
Nagy, B. (2011): A kvázi-hiperbolikus diszkontálás alkalmazása az optimális szabadalmak 
elméletében. (The application of quasi hyperbolic discounting in the optimal patents 
theorem.) Szigma, XLII. 1–2: 57–77.
Nagy, M. (2015): Forintosítás – hogy is volt ez? (Forint conversion – what actually happened?) 
https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/15-01-28-nagy-marton-istvan-forintositas-hogy-is-volt-ez.
pdf Downloaded: 10 December 2015.
Neszveda, G. – Dezső, L. (2012): A kvázi- és általánosított hiperbolikus diszkontálás hosszú 
távon. (Quasi and generalised hyperbolic discounting in the long-term.) Szigma, XLIII. 
3–4: 163–177.
Neumann, J. – Morgenstern, O. (1953): Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, 
NJ. Princeton University Press.
Phelps, E. – Pollak, R. (1968): On Second-Best. National Saving and Game- Equilibrium 
Growth. Review of Economic Studies 35: 185–199. https://doi.org/10.2307/2296547. 
Samuelsen, P. (1937): A Note on Measurement of Utility. Review of Economic Studies, 4(2): 
155–561. https://doi.org/10.2307/2967612. 
Sebestyén, K. – Pintér, K. – Zsebő, B. (2011): Banki ajánlatok a viselkedési közgazdaságtan 
tükrében. (Bank proposals in light of behavioural economics.) Nemzetközi Bankárképző 
Központ. (The paper was written for tender number VKK 2/2010 of the Hungarian 
Competition Authority’s Competition Culture Centre VKK.)
Stango, V. – Zinman, J. (2009): Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance. Journal of 
Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(6) December: 2807–2849. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01518.x. 
Száz, J. (2015): A PKK-szindróma napjainkban: Széljegyzetek Kornai János legújabb 
gyűjteményes kötetéhez. (The PKK syndrome at present: Notes for the latest collected 
works of János Kornai.) Magyar Tudomány 1: 75–86.
Tóth, I.J. – Árvai, Zs. (2001): Likviditási korlát és fogyasztói türelmetlenség: A magyar 
háztartások fogyasztási és megtakarítási döntéseinek empirikus vizsgálata (The liquidity 
constraint and consumer impatience: An empirical examination of consumption and saving 
decisions by Hungarian households). Közgazdasági Szemle, 48(12): 1009–1038.
Tversky, A. – Kahneman, D. (1974): Judgments and Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 
New Series, 185 (4157): 1124–1131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124. 
